Abstract-Motivated by information-theoretic security, link signature (LS)-based security mechanisms exploit the ample channel characteristics between wireless devices for security establishment. Nevertheless, LS is originated from wireless environments and hence may exhibit potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversary in the vicinity. As to this, it is widely believed in existing literature on LS that, a half-wavelength guard zone is sufficient to decorrelate the adversary channel from the legitimate one and thereby secures the legitimate LS. However, such an assumption may not hold universally-in some environments, high channel correlations have been observed for much larger spatial separations. Considering this, a comprehensive understanding of channel correlation in different wireless environments is needed for more confident deployment of LS-based security mechanisms. To this end, various well-established channel correlation models are investigated in this work. A set of important physical factors that have significant influence on LS security are identified, and with the obtained insights, extensive simulations are conducted to explore suitable guard zone sizes for LS in several typical indoor and outdoor environments. Experimental results based on universal software radio peripheral (USRP) platforms and GNURadio are also presented to further support the analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
W HILE conventional computational-complexity based cryptography has received great success, there is a haunting concern that building security on the hardness of computing problems is not worry-free, leaving the secrecy of systems vulnerable to the invention of super-power computers or efficient algorithms in the future. This concern has rekindled the interest on information-theoretic security originally considered in [3] . Building upon common randomness rather than the computational hardness, the security established through information-theoretic approaches (e.g., [4] - [8] and references therein) is free from the concerns about adversary's computational power. Particularly, it has been shown theoretically March 8, 2016 . This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Security Agency, through the NCSU Science of Security Lablet, and in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-1016260, Grant ECCS-1307949, and Grant EARS-1444009. Portions of this work were presented in [1] and [2] . The associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication was G. Yue.
X. He that, when two wireless nodes observe a common random process, secret key generation is possible by reconciling errors of the observed sequence over a public channel and distilling information unobservable to the adversary [9] , [10] .
Motivated by the concepts in information-theoretic security, link signature (LS) based security protocols have been developed recently. The underlying idea is that LS, which refers to the ample channel characteristics between two wireless devices, is nearly reciprocal in many scenarios and hence can serve as the source of common randomness for secret key generation. 1 In [11] , a scheme for generating secret bits from correlated observations of deep fades is proposed, with the focus on the theoretical construction for randomness extraction through universal hash families. Later, a practical level-crossing algorithm that extracts secret bits from channel impulse response is developed in [12] , [13] . Further extensions of this technique to wideband systems [14] , environments with different variations [15] and multi-antenna systems [16] have also been explored in literature. A more comprehensive survey on LS based secret key extraction can be found in [17] . Another prominent application of LS is location distinction (a.k.a. physical layer authentication). Particularly, location distinction based on the received signal strength [18] , the channel gains of multi-tonal probes [19] and the multipath characteristics [20] have been considered in literature, and a comparison of these different forms of LS is given in [21] . In [22] , a generalized likelihood ratio test based spoofing detection is proposed to further improve location distinction accuracy. 2 LS based location distinction using MIMO channels has been examined in literature as well [23] .
While providing a good complement at the physical layer to security establishment, LS originates from wireless environments and hence may exhibit vulnerabilities that also arise because of the wireless environment. Recently, several potential attacks that can severely impair the security established by LS based mechanisms have been revealed by researchers. For example, an active virtual multipath attack is proposed in [24] to defeat LS based location distinction, in which the attacker creates an "artificial channel" that can mimic a real multipath propagation to spoof the legitimate system. While in this work, we focus on passive attacks, in which, the adversary deploys sensors near the legitimate transceivers and aims at inferring the legitimate channel information and the corresponding LS through its own channel measurements [1] , [25] . To defend against such attacks, guard zones with suitable sizes must be deployed around the legitimate devices. As to this, existing LS based security schemes often assume that the legitimate and the adversary channels are essentially uncorrelated and hence the attacker can barely acquire any useful information about the legitimate LS, as long as the adversary receiver is separated from the legitimate one by more than half a wavelength; and such assumed fast channel decorrelation has been observed in [26] . However, high channel correlation has been observed in practice as well, even when the spatial separation is more than half-wavelength, though in the context of MIMO systems [27] . These seemingly contradictory facts indicate that channel correlation varies in different environments. Then, the following questions naturally arise: When does the half-wavelength assumption hold? What will be the suitable guard zone size to protect the LS? Answering these questions is crucial to a more efficient and confident deployment of LS based security mechanisms, since an unnecessarily large guard zone increases the deployment cost and restricts the application while a too small one will render the legitimate systems in danger.
To help dispel misconceptions and promote further advancement of LS techniques based on a more solid foundation, this work contributes in the following aspects. First, a novel correlation attack is designed to demonstrate the potential vulnerability of LS based security mechanisms when the commonly believed half-wavelength guard zone is blindly adopted, with both theoretical and numerical justifications; to the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to raise this concern. In addition, as few existing literature has ever explored channel correlation and the impact of physical-layer parameters in the context of LS security, another contribution of this work is to comprehensively investigate well-established channel correlation models (e.g., [28] - [31] ) and endeavor to identify some important physical factors at the wireless medium that have significant implications to LS security. Moreover, a generic channel correlation model that synthesizes the obtained understandings is presented to facilitate LS security assessment. With this model, suitable guard zone sizes are numerically explored for LS based security mechanisms in several typical indoor and outdoor communication scenarios. Finally, real-world experiments through Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) platforms and GNURadio are conducted to further corroborate our findings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II demonstrates the existence of high channel correlation and the potential vulnerability of LS. Important factors and models influencing channel correlations and LS security are explored in Section III. Numerical and experimental results are presented in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Section VI concludes this work.
II. POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY OF LS AND THE CORRELATION ATTACK
Wireless signal usually propagates along multiple paths depending on the specific scattering environment, and the resulting channel impulse response between a pair of nodes is referred to as the LS, which can be exploited for security provisioning. For example, based on the observation that a location change of the transmitter often results in a different LS measured at the receiver side, LS based location distinction/ authentication has been developed [18] - [23] . Also, as the wireless channel between two nodes is usually reciprocal, LS can be used as the common secret to establish secured communication [11] - [17] . More detailed background on LS can be found in [11] - [23] and the references therein.
It is worth noticing that, since the security established by LS based mechanisms relies on the confidentiality of the channel information between the corresponding legitimate transmitter (T l ) and receiver (R l ), a widely adopted assumption is that, when the legitimate receiver and the adversary receiver (R a ) are separated by more than half a wavelength (λ/2), the corresponding complex channel coefficients h T l ,R l and h T l ,R a are essentially decorrelated such that the adversary can barely acquire any information about the legitimate channel [11] - [23] . Nevertheless, as will be illustrated in the rest of this work, the half-wavelength decorrelation assumption does not hold universally -two wireless channels can be highly correlated over a much larger spatial range in some situations, and in such cases, the adversary can undermine the promised security of LS based mechanisms through the correlation attack. 3 In the following, the correlation between the legitimate and the adversary channels is defined as 4 ,
Since most of the existing LS based applications (e.g., [12] , [20] ) utilize channel envelope information |h|, we will focus on channel envelope correlations, defined as
throughout this work, and ρ env is related to the complex channel correlation coefficient ρ in (1) through ρ env ≈ |ρ| 2 [32] .
A. Channel Correlation Based on One-Ring Model
We start our discussion from the one-ring model [28] , [33] , [34] . As well-supported by real-world evidence, the one-ring model is suitable to characterize the correlation between two wireless channels when one communication end is surrounded by rich scatterers while the other end experiences much less diffusion (Fig. 1) . According to this model, the correlation between a pair of channels h pq and h p q is given by [34] 
where ϕ admits From (3) it can be noted that, in general, the channel correlation ρ pq, p q depends on not only the transceiver spatial separations d pp and dbut also several other important factors, including 1) the angle spread arcsin(R/D) with R and D determined by the geometry shown in Fig. 1 , 2) the power azimuth spread (PAS) f (θ ), characterizing the scatterer density over the azimuth θ on the scatterer-ring, and 3) θ T and θ R , determined by the azimuth positions of the transceivers. Since all these factors are environment-dependent, it is not difficult to realize that channel correlation will change in different environments.
To apply the one-ring model to LS security analysis, one can modify it by setting p = p = T l , q = R l and q = R a when rich scattering resides at the receiver side (Fig. 2) , and then employ (3) to compute the corresponding correlation between the legitimate and the adversary channels; the case of transmitter side scattering can be processed similarly by switching the roles of corresponding quantities.
With this modeling, the impacts of the angle spread and adversary receiver position on channel envelope correlation ρ env are examined when the PAS is uniform (i.e., f (θ ) = 1/2π ). The corresponding results are presented in Fig. 3 . Several important observations can be made: 1) When the scatterer ring is on the receiver side, the legitimate and the adversary channels will be quickly decorrelated by these local scatterers ( Fig. 3(a)-3(b) ). In such rich scattering environments, the fast spatial decorrelation assumed by existing LS techniques is valid. 2) However, when the scatterer-ring is on the transmitter side while the receivers are free from local scattering, a small angle spread can induce fairly high channel correlations, as can be seen from sensor along the transmitter-to-receiver direction (corresponding to θ R = 0 • ). For example, with a small angel spread = 2 • , the adversary can increase the channel correlation from 0.05 ( Fig. 3(c) ) to 0.99 ( Fig. 3(d) ) by changing θ R from 90 • to 0 • , even when the spatial separation δd between the legitimate and the adversary receivers is 10λ, thus incurring security concerns.
B. Correlation Attack to LS
In this subsection, the correlation attack is introduced to illustrate how the attacker can exploit the high channel correlation (when it exists) to impair the security of LS.
In the correlation attack, the adversary deploys n (≥ 1) receivers, denoted by {R a i } n i=1 , in the vicinity of the legitimate receiver; then based on the measured channels, denoted
T (with T denoting the transpose operator) from these receivers, it constructs an estimateĥ T l ,R l of the legitimate channel h T l ,R l through linear minimum mean square error (LMMSE) estimation. 5 Specifically,ĥ T l ,R l is given by 6ĥ
where
is the correlation vector between the legitimate channel and the adversary channels, and C n×n Cov(h a , h a ) is the correlation matrix of the adversary channels. Several related analytical results are in order. 5 The LMMSE estimator is optimal when the random variables involved are jointly Gaussian (often assumed in communications when the central limit theorem can be invoked), and widely adopted in practice due to its simplicity and good performance [35] . It is used here to convey the basic idea while in practice other estimators can be used as well. 6 In (6), the assumption that all the statistics are known is reasonable for certain practical situations. For example, the adversary party can deploy the transceivers in a similar environment to obtain estimates of these statistics (and build databases), or they can infer from specific physical models (e.g., the onering model) when these models are known to match the environment of interest well. 
Proposition 1: The MSE of the LMMSE estimateĥ
is the variance of the legitimate receiver channel.
Proof: Please see Appendix A. Remark 1: In the special case of n = 1, it can be verified that the normalized (with respect to the variance A of h T l ,R l ) MSE ofĥ T l ,R l is 1 − ρ 2 (with ρ denoting the correlation coefficient between the legitimate and the adversary channels), which indicates that higher channel correlation allows the attacker to obtain finer estimate and thereby causes more severe threats to the legitimate LS.
Proposition 2: The estimatorĥ T l ,R l is always no worse than that based on any subset of {h T l ,R a i } n i=1 with k(< n) adversary sensors.
Proof: Please see Appendix B. Actually, not only thatĥ T l ,R l becomes more accurate with more adversary receivers deployed, it can be also shown that in some circumstances with the presence of sufficient high correlation between the legitimate and the adversary channels, the adversary is even capable of perfectly reconstructing the legitimate channel by increasing the number of adversary receivers, as given in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Assume that the correlation between any adversary and the legitimate channels is ρ, and the correlation between any two adversary channels is ρ . Then, if ρ 2 > ρ , there exists an n = 1−ρ ρ 2 −ρ , such that the MSE of the attacker's estimate can be driven down to zero when employing n adversary receivers.
Proof: Please see Appendix C. To further illustrate Corollary 1, numerical result for ρ = 0.9 and ρ = 0.8 is presented in Fig. 4 . From Fig. 4 , it can be seen that, 8 to 10 adversary receivers will result in satisfactory estimation quality to the attacker, and by further increasing to 20 adversary receivers, the adversary can even achieve perfect estimation.
Then we move one step further to consider a more practical example, where the channel correlations among all channels are assumed to be determined by the one-ring model with transmitter side scattering and the adversary receivers are deployed along the transmitter-to-receiver direction (i.e., θ R = 0 • in (3)) as shown in Fig. 5 . The corresponding normalized MSE's of the attacker's estimate for different numbers of adversary sensors are given by Proposition 1 and presented in Fig. 6 . As shown in Fig. 6 , when is small ( = 6 • ) and the PAS is uniform, a single adversary receiver placed around 5 wavelengths away from the legitimate receiver is able to achieve a target normalized MSE 0.05. If the adversary has two collaborative receivers, both of them may be put at least 10 wavelengths away, and for eight adversary receivers the target is still achieved even if the spatial separation is 20 wavelengths.
These results clearly indicate that the commonly believed half-wavelength separation may not be sufficient to protect the LS itself in certain environments. For a more clear understanding on the suitable guard zones for LS in different environments, a more comprehensive studies on channel correlation will be conducted in the next section.
III. KEY CHANNEL FACTORS/MODELS FOR LS SECURITY
In this section, various wireless channel correlation models are investigated and several key factors that have substantial impacts on channel correlation and LS security are identified.
A. Power Azimuth Spectrum and the Azimuth Spread
Besides the angle spread discussed in Section II-A, the PAS f (θ ) (c.f. (3)), which describes the scatterer density over the azimuth θ , is another important factor for channel correlation and LS security. In addition to the uniform PAS assumed previously, various other PAS's are also proposed in literature such as the cosine function PAS [36] , the truncated uniform PAS [37] , the truncated Gaussian PAS [38] [39], the von-Mises PAS [34] and the truncated Laplacian PAS [40] . These singlemode scatterer distributions (i.e., scatterers mostly concentrate around a mean azimuthθ ) are compared in Fig. 7 , and can be easily extended to multi-mode ones when multiple clusters of scatterers exist [40] .
The azimuth spread (AS) 7 is a generic metric to measure the concentrations of scatterers for different PAS's, which is defined as [37] 
The AS ranges from 0 to 1 where AS = 0 corresponds to signal incidence from a single direction and AS = 1 corresponds to all-around arrivals. 8 Fig . 8 presents the spatial channel correlation functions for different PAS's with the same AS, based on the one-ring model (3). It can be seen that 1) channel correlation is not very sensitive to the particular forms of PAS but is mainly determined by the corresponding AS, and that 2) a smaller AS always leads to higher channel correlation. This implies that much larger guard zones are needed to ensure sufficient decorrelation between the legitimate and the adversary channels for better LS protection, in the environments where scatterers are highly concentrated. For example, when the scatterers follow the cos n distribution with n = 8.5, a guard zone with radius larger than 10λ is needed, instead of the commonly assumed half-wavelength, to keep the correlation below 0.1.
B. Rician Factor
In addition to the (random) diffusion component induced by the scattering effect (as considered in (3)), a wireless channel may also contain a (deterministic) line-of-sight (LOS) component. For such cases, the so-called Rician factor, denoted by K , is defined as the power ratio between these two components, and correspondingly a space-time correlationρ may be defined as in [34] , given by 
where the space-time correlation for the diffusion component ρ DI F pq, p q can be computed by (3) with a scaling factor 1/(1 + K ), and that for the LOS component is given by
Based on (8), it can be verified that a large Rician factor induces high space-time correlation, which seemingly implies a severe vulnerability of LS when a strong LOS component exists. Considering this, existing LS based security applications are investigated as to how the LOS component is handled. It is found that, in most LS based secret key generation algorithms, the LOS component is removed from the channel measurement before the key generation process [12] , [15] , [16] , [42] , [43] , and that, in most location distinction algorithms, the LOS effect is also removed implicitly by comparing the difference between two channel measurements to the standard deviation (instead of the channel magnitude) [20] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [44] . Therefore, the existence of the LOS component will not have a significant impact on the security of these LS based applications. In the following, only the diffusion part will be considered.
C. Directive Antenna
In practice, a directional antenna is often used to enhance communication performance by suppressing signals from unwanted directions. The gain of a directive antenna in azimuth θ is characterized by its radiation pattern G(θ ), which is parameterized by the main lobe directionθ G and the 3dB antenna beamwidth θ 3d B .
When the adversary employs the same directive antenna as the legitimate receiver, the corresponding channel correlation is given by [40] 
where receiver side scattering is assumed. 9 It is worth noting from (10) that, mathematically, the PAS f (·) and the antenna radiation pattern G(·) have equivalent impacts on channel correlation. Based on (10), the spatial correlation functions with different radiation patterns are compared in Fig. 9 , where a truncated uniform PAS with θ max = 10 • and θ min = −10 • is assumed. It can be seen that highly directional antennas (with small θ 3d B ) can induce large channel correlations, and hence larger guard zones will be required to protect the legitimate LS. For example, when directive antennas with θ 3d B = 5 • are adopted, the guard zone size has to be increased substantially from 3λ to 10λ to ensure the correlation between the adversary and the legitimate channels below 0.05. (Similar trends are also observed for other PAS's as well.)
An intuitive explanation for the correlation boosting phenomenon of directive antenna is as follows [2] , [46] : First notice that channel decorrelation is essentially caused by that the signal phase shifts due to different scatterers are independent; the directive antenna will suppress the signals reflected by those scatterers in unwanted direction (which equivalently leads to a more concentrated PAS) and hence reduces the randomness in scattering, inducing high channel correlation. In 9 In the cases of small angle spread assumed by the one-ring model, the incident signal's spread in angular domain will be smaller than the antenna's 3dB beamwidth when the scatterers reside on the transmitter side, and hence, using directive antenna may not change the channel correlation significantly. general, channel correlation boosting effect appears only when directive antenna reduces the angular domain spread of effective scatterers, i.e., the scatterers illuminated by the directive antenna, as shown in Fig. 10 , which explains why in Fig. 9 , channel correlation is significantly enhanced only when θ 3d B < (θ max − θ min ).
D. Other Models for Different Scattering Environments
Different scattering environments other than that assumed by the one-ring model exist in practice, and several other channel models will be studied in this subsection to account for these cases. For these models, previous conclusions as to angle spread, PAS/AS, Rician factor and directive antenna in the one-ring model carry over when applicable.
1) Two-Ring Models:
In both indoor and outdoor environments, both communication ends may be enclosed by local scatterers. In these cases, two-ring models [29] , [30] , [47] - [49] can be employed to characterize the corresponding channel correlation. With different assumptions on signal propagation, both the single-bounce and the double-bounce two-ring models are proposed in literature.
In the single-bounce two-ring model, it is assumed that the received signals are reflected by either the transmitter side or the receiver side scatterers, as depicted in Fig. 11 . With this assumption, the single-bounce model is in fact a weighted superposition of two one-ring models with corresponding scatterer-rings on the transmitter and the receiver sides, respectively [30] . The correlation due to transmitter side scatterers is given by 10
where θ and ϕ admit similar relations in (4) and (5). The correlation due to receiver side scatterers is given by
The overall correlation is given by
where η S BT and η S B R represent the strengths of the reflected signals from the two scatterer-rings, respectively, and admit η S BT + η S B R = 1. In the double-bounce two-ring model [29] , wireless signals get reflected and scattered at both the transmitter side and receiver side scatterers; nevertheless, it can be verified that, for the purpose of LS security assessment where only one transmitter is considered, the double-bounce two-ring model reduces to the one-ring model.
2) Elliptical Ring Model:
In the elliptical scatterer-ring model, an elliptical scatterer-ring encloses both the transmitter and the receivers, as depicted in Fig. 12 . This model may be applied to office environments where the two communication ends are not far from each other and surrounded by common scatterers nearby. Denoting the major and minor radii of the ellipse by a and b, respectively, the corresponding channel correlation is given by [31] 
where f E denotes the PAS of the elliptical scatterer-ring; α T and α R are functions of θ determined by the geometry shown in Fig. 12 , and they correspond to the angles of departure and arrival, respectively, with respect to the scatterer at angle θ . Channel correlation under elliptical scatterer-ring modeling is shown in Fig. 13 . It can be seen that a narrower elliptical scatterer-ring (i.e., smaller a) will induce higher channel correlation, which in turn indicates a requirement of larger guard zones for LS protection. 10 The subscripts T and R of f (G) denote the transmitter and receiver side PAS (antenna pattern), respectively. 3) Far Scatterer-Ring Model: A far scatterer-ring model in which the scatterers that are distant from both communication ends, as depicted in Fig. 14 , has been considered in [50] , and it is indicated that the correlation function due to far scatterers is mathematically the same as that due to local scatterers with the displacement of the ring center. Based on this principle, the correlation function due to far scatterers can be derived as
where f F denotes the PAS of the far scatterer-ring with corresponding angle spread defined as F arcsin(R F /D); α T and α R , which correspond to the angles of departure and arrival, respectively, with respect to the scatterer at angle θ , are determined by the geometry shown in Fig. 14 (and thus are implicitly related to F ); other relevant parameters can be found in Fig. 14. Based on (15), channel correlation due to far scatterers is examined in Fig. 15 . It can be seen from Fig. 15(a) that for the same x-position of the scatterer-ring center, higher correlation is observed when the scatterer-ring is more distant away from the LOS (i.e., when H F in Fig. 14 is larger) , and from Fig. 15(b)-15(d) that small angle spread, highly concentrated PAS and directive antenna pattern will induce high channel correlation, as in the near-scatterer case.
E. A Generic Channel Correlation Model for LS
Based on the previous discussions, the key channel factors and models for LS security assessment are summarized in Table I , together with the corresponding most favorable values in terms of LS security. Based on the obtained understanding and insights, a generic channel correlation model that includes the security implications of all these factors and models is given as follows:
where the sub-model coefficients admit η S BT + η S B R + η E + η F = 1 and ρ (S BT ) , ρ (S B R) , ρ (E) and ρ (F) are given by (11), (12) , (14) and (15), respectively. Some explanations are in order. First, the LOS component is omitted, since it will not change the adversary's attacking performance, as discussed in Section III-B. The one-ring model is a special case of the single-bounce two-ring model captured here, and so is the double-bounce two-ring model as far as LS security assessment is concerned. As will be seen in the next section, this weighted sum form provides flexibility in modeling channel correlations in various environments of interest with properly chosen weighting coefficients, either by selecting the most suitable model (as in Scenario I), or by an appropriate combination of roughly independent sub-models (as in Scenario II and III).
IV. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
As can be noted from the above discussions, the correlation of wireless channels varies substantially depending on the scattering environment and hence, the commonly believed halfwavelength cannot ensure LS security universally. As will be shown in this section, in many scenarios, much larger guard zone may need to be deployed around legitimate devices for security assurance of LS-based mechanisms.
Specifically, the guard zone sizes for three typical wireless communication scenarios are numerically explored. The performance of two LS based security mechanisms, secret key generation [12] and location distinction [20] , is investigated under the correlation attack discussed in Section II-B when guard zones of different sizes are deployed. To account for various physical environments, multiple combinations of parameters are chosen for each of the three scenarios. In all simulations, the legitimate and the adversary channels assume Rayleigh fading with correlation given by (16) based on the corresponding environment parameters. We mainly present the results for the one adversary receiver case to convey the basic idea; when multiple collaborative adversary receivers are deployed, even larger guard zones are needed, as indicated by Proposition 2.
Considering that in practice different cryptographic algorithms and detection thresholds may be used for LS based secret key extraction and location distinction, two security levels, Lv1 and Lv2, are considered in this work. For Lv1 (Lv2) security, it is assumed that the promised security by the LS is thwarted if the normalized MSE 11 of the adversary's estimated channel in the location distinction application is below 0.1 (0.5) or more than 90% (50%) secret key bits are inferred by the adversary. For secret key extraction, the level-crossing algorithm in [12] is implemented where 1 × 10 4 samples are generated for each channel and an excursion of length 4 is used. 12 Finally, the (empirical) outage probability P out (δd) for each scenario, defined as
is employed as the metric for LS security assessment, where N insecure and N total are the number of insecure and the number of total considered environments in each scenario, respectively. A non-zero P out (δd) implies the existence of environment(s) where the LS application is insecure when the guard zone size is δd. Clearly, Lv2 specification is easier for the adversary to achieve and thus indicates a higher outage probability for the same guard zone size, or demands a larger guard zone size for the same outage probability. A typical indoor scenario (Scenario I) is considered first, where both the legitimate transceivers and the adversary receiver are in the same office. In such a scenario, both communication ends are surrounded by common scatterers, and hence the elliptical scatterer-ring model can be used to characterize the corresponding channel correlations (i.e., η E = 1). To account for various physical environments in this scenario, 42 different parameter combinations are considered, as given in Table II Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 show the outage probabilities for LS based location distinction and secret key extraction, respectively, in Scenario I. It can be seen that the commonly believed safe-distance λ/2 is not sufficient to secure the LS applications for all the cases. For example, as shown in Fig. 16 , when δd = λ/2, in more than 50% of the considered cases with omnidirectional antennas, the adversary can obtain an estimate of the legitimate LS with normalized MSE less than 0.1 and thus defeats the Lv1 security requirement of location distinction; it becomes even worse (i.e., larger P out ) when both the legitimate and adversary receivers adopt directive antennas, or Lv2 security is considered. Similar observations can be made in Fig. 17 for LS based secret key extraction as well. In fact, the results in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 suggest that a guard zone of size about δd = 19λ is needed to achieve Lv1 security with zero outage probability for LS. 13 For the more demanding Lv2 security, even larger guard zones are required.
In the second scenario (Scenario II), it is assumed that the transmitter is inside the office (with rich scattering) while both the legitimate and the adversary receivers are in the hallway (with much less scattering). A single-bounce two ring model with weighting coefficients η S BT = 0.9 and η S B R = 0.1 is employed to characterize the channel correlations, and the corresponding parameter settings are given in Table III with a total of 336 combinations. Again, a guard zone of size δd = λ/2 cannot ensure LS security, as shown in Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 . Instead, a guard zone of size δd = 12λ has to be deployed to achieve Lv1 security. Although a smaller guard zone is required in this scenario for Lv1 security, it can be seen by comparing Figs. [16] [17] that Scenario II requires a larger guard zone for Lv2 security as compared to Scenario I. The last scenario (Scenario III) assumes a base station-tomobile user communication where the transmitter is assumed high raised (with less scattering) and the legitimate and adversary receivers are surrounded by scatterers, and far scatterers exist as well. A weighted combination of one-ring and far scatterer-ring models (with η S B R = 0.8 and η F = 0.2) is employed to characterize the channel correlation in such scenario, and the corresponding parameter settings are given in Table IV with a total of 3136 combinations. As it can be seen from Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 that δd = 5λ is required for Lv1 security and Lv2 again requires a larger guard zone. In this outdoor scenario, the dense local scatterers (η S B R = 0.8) around the receivers decorrelate the legitimate and the adversary channels fairly quickly and thus provide better security protection for LS (i.e., smaller guard zones are needed), as compared to the previous two indoor scenarios.
V. EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION
In this section, experiment results obtained from Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) platforms and GNURadio prototype implementation are presented. It is worth pointing out that high channel correlation has already been observed, even when the spatial separation is more than λ/2, in the context of MIMO systems [27] . The experiment results and discussions presented here focus on the LS context and aim at providing real-world justification to the previous study. In our experiments, the carrier frequency is 2.4 GHz with the corresponding wavelength 12.5 cm and the channel sampling rate is 100 samples/sec. Both indoor and outdoor experiments are conducted. In each experiment, 40 pairs of legitimate and adversary channels are recorded for two different spatial separations δd = 1.5λ and δd = 3.3λ, respectively. Based on these channel measurements, the normalized MSE between the legitimate and the adversary channels are computed to assess the LS based location distinction, while the match rates ξ between the secret keys generated from the legitimate channel and the adversary channel are computed to assess the LS based secret key extraction.
The setting of the indoor experiment is depicted in Fig. 22(a) . In this experiment, the transmitter is placed in an office room ( Fig. 22(b) ) with ample scatterers around, while the two receivers (with one of them serving the role of the adversary sensor) are located at the end of the hallway with a large glass window behind, receiving less scattering. Fig. 23 presents channel samples of one (out of the 40) experiment for δd = 3.3λ, and it can be seen that, even when the corresponding spatial separation is substantially larger than half-wavelength, the legitimate and the adversary channels can still exhibit high correlation. When the adversary further employs LMMSE estimation in (6), the corresponding average values of channel correlation (ρ), normalized MSE (N M SE) and key match rate (ξ ) over the collection of all channel measurements are summarized in Table V , where the numbers in the parentheses are the corresponding sample standard deviations. It can be seen that even when the adversary receiver is separated from the legitimate one by more than half-wavelength, fairly high correlations around 0.8 are observed; in these cases, the attacker can construct an estimate of the legitimate LS with normalized MSE The setting of the outdoor experiment is depicted in Fig. 24 , where the transmitter is placed behind a building pillar while the two receivers are placed in a large open lawn (without much scatterers nearby). The corresponding experiment results are summarized in Table VI . Again, it can be observed that the adversary can recover the legitimate LS and the corresponding generated secret bits with substantial fidelity.
In the environments of these two experiments, if guard zones with size of only half-wavelength are deployed, a large portion of the secrecy of the legitimate LS will be inferred by the attacker and hence the promised security protection to the legitimate devices is significantly weakened. 14 This observation is consistent with our previous analysis, and in fact, the one-ring model may be employed to provide an intuitive explanation: In both experiments, the transmitter is surrounded by relatively rich scatterers while the receivers experience much less scatterering; in such cases, two wireless channels will be highly correlated given a small angle spread. In such environments, much larger guard zones are needed to protect the legitimate LS.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
After illustrating potential vulnerabilities of LS through correlation attack when high channel correlation exists, several key factors that have important influence on LS security are identified through a comprehensive investigation of well-established channel models. With the obtained understanding and insights, a generic model characterizing the spatial correlation between the legitimate and the adversary channels is developed to explore proper guard zone sizes for LS based security schemes. 14 The exact amount of performance degradation to an LS based security scheme depends on the specific implementation and is beyond the scope of this work.
Both our numerical and experimental results indicate that spatial channel correlation varies for different wireless environments. In particular, the commonly believed half-wavelength decorrelation assumption is valid mainly in environments with rich scattering; while in poor scattering environments, the legitimate and the adversary channels may decorrelate much slower over space than expected. These findings suggest that in practice, more careful investigation on channel correlation for the specific environment of interest must be conducted before a confident deployment of LS based security mechanisms. 15 
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APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Let S = A − B T C −1 B be the Schur complement of block C in . Then, . 15 How to efficiently estimate the (dynamic) wireless environments while still perform LS based security mechanisms itself is a fundamental issue. But it is beyond the scope of this work and remains an interesting future direction. 
where ω k = exp( j 
where in the second last step the fact n−1 k=0 ω k i = δ(i) is applied.
Then, Corollary 1 follows readily by setting M SE(ĥ T l ,R l ) = 0 in (22) .
